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ABSTRACT
How significant are individual differences in self-control? Do these differences impact wealth
accumulation? From where do they derive? Our survey-based measure of self-control provides
insights into all three questions:  1.There are individual differences in self-control not only of a
quantitative but also of a qualitative nature. In our sample, standard self-control problems of over-
consumption are no more prevalent than are problems of under-consumption.  2.Standard self-
control problems do impede wealth accumulation, particularly in liquid form. Problems of under-
consumption have the opposite effects.  3.Self-control is linked to "conscientiousness", a personality
trait much studied by psychologists. There is a related link with financial planning.
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That self-control problems may in theory impede wealth accumulation has
been understood for almost 50 years (Strotz [1956], Laibson [1997]). Yet em-
pirical conﬁrmation has been lacking. In this paper we use survey techniques
t ov e r i f yt h ei m p o r t a n c eo ft h es e l f - c o n t r o l - w e a l t hl i n k . A tt h es a m et i m e ,
we shed new light both on the profound individual diﬀerences in self-control,
and on the underlying determinants of these diﬀerences.
Our survey-based approach to measuring self-control has roots in the ﬁnd-
ings of Mischel and his collaborators on delay of gratiﬁcation (Shoda, Mischel,
and Peake [1988]). Yet our precise formulation exploits recent advances in
self-control theory, in particular the model of Gul and Pesendorfer [2001].
As described in section 2, we use an allocation scenario to elicit the level of
self-control in this model. To a ﬁrst approximation, self-control is measured
as the diﬀerence between the intertemporal allocation initially viewed as op-
timal and the allocation that would be chosen in practice. Three ﬁndings
concerning this measure of self-control stand out:
1. The current view of self-control problems as involving the need to sup-
press the immediate urge to consume is inadequate. In our sample,
“present-bias” (the urge to consume today more than would be ideal)
is no more prevalent than is “future-bias” (a tendency to consume less
today than would be ideal), as shown in section 3.
2. We identify a robust relationship between measured self-control and the
level of net worth, detailed in section 4. Those who believe that they
will consume at a faster than ideal rate in our allocation scenario are
less wealthy than those with the opposite beliefs. Self-control problems
have a particularly powerful impact on the level of liquid wealth, in
accordance with theoretical predictions.
3. Individual diﬀerences in self-control relate to deep diﬀerences in overall
personality structure. The most well-researched measures of individ-
ual diﬀerences are the “Big Five” personality factors. One such factor,
conscientiousness, is seen by psychologists as strongly related to self-
control. In conﬁrmation, we show in section 5 that high levels of consci-
entiousness reduce the scale of both problems of over-consumption and
problems of under-consumption. This suggests that the positive asso-
ciation between planning (an aspect of conscientiousness) and wealth
1accumulation identiﬁed by Lusardi [1999] may be intermediated by self-
control (see also Ameriks, Caplin, and Leahy [2003a]).
Our ﬁndings rely on strong identifying assumptions concerning the inter-
pretation of our survey questions. In section 6 we explore possible explana-
tions for our results when these assumptions are false. None of these stand
out as more compelling than our self-control based explanations.
Our results suggest that the impact of self-control problems on wealth ac-
cumulation is more intricate than is currently believed. Exploring the savings
behavior of the very wealthy, Carroll [2000] hypothesized that their behavior
could be understood only if they derived utility directly from wealth. Simi-
larly, our results suggest that much wealth may be in the hands of “under-
consumers”: households who are tempted to accumulate rather than to con-
sume. On a related note, Krusell, Kuruscu, and Smith [2002] calibrate a
variant of the Gul-Pesendorfer model of asset pricing. They ﬁnd that the
model better ﬁts with various asset pricing facts, such as the risk-free rate
puzzle, if the temptation is to save rather than to consume.
Going beyond the sphere of wealth accumulation, our results suggest the
need for researchers to broaden their outlook on self-control problems. Ex-
isting theories in both economics and psychology treat these problems as
involving the inability to delay gratiﬁcation. Yet our ﬁnding of future-bias
suggests that self-control problems may underlie behaviors that have hitherto
been seen in a diﬀerent light. Additional research is needed not only on the
behavioral implications of future bias, but also on its origins.
2 Survey Methods and Self-Control
We begin by outlining the existing empirical literature on self-control. We
then outline our survey methodology, and the survey instrument itself. We
close by discussing the sense in which our survey methodology is novel, and
the sense in which it is familiar.
2.1 Literature Review
Laibson, Repetto, and Tobacman [2003] use data on wealth accumulation,
credit card borrowing, and consumption-income co-movement to estimate a
“representative” utility parameter governing self-control. In most speciﬁca-
tions, they reject the null of exponential discounting in favor of the hyperbolic
2discounting model of Laibson [1997]. Other eﬀorts to estimate the eﬀects of
self-control problems include Fang and Silverman [2002] and DeJong and
Ripoll [2003].
The paper by DellaVigna and Paserman [2001] is one of the few to assess
t h ei m p a c to findividual diﬀerences in self-control. They use cross-sectional
variation in self-control to predict variation in behavior.1 They show that
various indicators of self-control problems, such as smoking and contraceptive
use, are negatively related to job search eﬀort and exit rates from unemploy-
ment.
While Della Vigna and Paserman use behaviors to gauge individual dif-
ferences in self-control, economists have also used questionnaire techniques.
The traditional questions used to measure self-control involve asking how
much money an individual would require at various future dates in place
of a ﬁxed immediate reward (Thaler [1981], Chapman [1996]). The implied
discount rates are generally found to be far higher over short horizons, which
is taken as evidence that the respondent has a self-control problem caused
by over-weighting of the present. The extent of the self-control problem is
assumed to be reﬂected in the extent of this over-weighting.
The “time versus money” approach to measuring self-control has vari-
ous drawbacks, as pointed out by Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue
[2002]. One problem is that the answer may not be allocatively relevant.
The identiﬁcation of acceptance of the reward with a corresponding burst of
consumption is tenuous: just because I accept an additional $100 today does
not mean that I will immediately spend it on a fancy meal. There are many
other problems: an expressed preference for the present may arise because
immediate receipt of a reward is certain and convenient, while future receipt
is uncertain and inconvenient; the implied self-control problem appears to
be less signiﬁcant when non-trivial rewards are at stake; rational individuals,
even those with self-control problems, should use market interest rates to dis-
count monetary amounts (Fuchs [1982]); and the implied level of self-control
varies widely from experiment to experiment based on apparently irrelevant
changes in context (Rubinstein [2000]). Rather than looking to clean up this
procedure, we adopt an entirely diﬀerent approach to measuring self-control
inspired by the ﬁndings of the social psychologist, Walter Mischel.
1See also Passerman [2003].
32.2 Methodology
During the period 1968-1974, Mischel and his collaborators ran an experiment
oﬀering cookies to 550 four year old children of students and professors at
Stanford University. Each child was asked whether he or she would prefer to
h a v eo n ec o o k i eo rt w o :t h eu n i v e r s a lp r e f e r e n c ew a sf o rt w o .T h ea t t e n d i n g
psychologist then left the room, and the child was told that in order to get
both cookies, he or she would have to wait until the psychologist returned.
The child also had the option of calling the psychologist back into the room
prematurely, and receiving only one cookie rather than two. After 20 minutes,
the psychologist re-entered the room and appropriately rewarded any child
who had been suﬃciently patient.
Mischel conducted follow-up studies of parents in 1981-82 and in 1984,
asking them to complete a personality survey for their child (the Adolescent
Coping Questionnaire, ACQ), and to provide SAT scores. While the samples
were small (ACQ information for 134, SAT scores for 94), the ﬁndings were
striking. A strong relationship was found between the extent of the time
delay in the initial experiment and the following two personality measures
(Shoda et al. [1988]):
• How likely is your child to exhibit self-control in frustrating situations?
• How likely is your child to yield to temptation?
In both of the above cases, the coeﬃcient in a univariate regression was
signiﬁcant at the 0.1% level. Just as signiﬁcant was the relationship found
between ability to delay gratiﬁcation at age 4 and the Quantitative SAT
score.
Mischel’s results show that the ability to resist temptation is a very long
lasting personality trait with signiﬁcant cross domain validity. In addition,
this ability correlates with other important life outcomes, in particular aca-
demic achievement.2 The study also suggests the external validity of sur-
vey questions, such as those from the ACQ, based on intuitions concerning
temptation and self-control. Our approach to measuring self-control draws
2Even social psychologists, famously reluctant to acknowledge that character structure
displays any cross-domain regularities, have been forced to conclude that self-control dif-
ferences may underlie diﬀerences in behavior and achievement over long periods of time.
Ironically, the case against character variables as explanators of behavior is most strongly
associated with Mischel himself (Mischel [1968]).
4on these insights. Following Mischel, we hypothesize that self-control charac-
teristics apply across many distinct domains, and that over time individuals
become aware of their own level of self-control. To gain access to this knowl-
edge, we present individuals with a hypothetical scenario involving possible
temptation, and ask them to reﬂect on their ability to resist. To increase pre-
cision, we use the temptation and self-control model of Gul and Pesendorfer
[2001] as a guide in framing our questions.
2.3 Temptation and Self-Control
Gul and Pesendorfer show that a speciﬁc assumption on preferences over
choice sets, set betweenness, when added to other standard assumptions,
gives rise to a new and fascinating class of utility functions. With these as-
sumptions, observed behavior maximizes the sum of a standard direct utility
function, and an additional “temptation”-based utility.
Consider a standard two period problem of allocating a ﬁxed physi-
cal supply of a perfectly storable consumption good, W,a c r o s st w op e r i -
ods. A Gul-Pesendorfer consumer maximizes the sum of a classical utility
function and a second “temptation” function, T(c1,c 2). The utility associ-
ated with a particular set of feasible consumption choices, A ⊂ Γ(W) ≡ ©
(c1,c 2) ∈ R2
+|c1 + c2 ≤ W
ª
,i s :
V (A)= m a x
(c1,c2)∈A




+ → R. Actual choices are made as a compromise between the
“standard” utility function and the temptation function: the agent may be
willing to move away from the otherwise ideal choice in order to reduce the
disutility associated with rejecting the most tempting option.
A simple special case serves to clarify the workings of the model. Let
both functions be logarithmic,
U(c1,c 2)=ilnc1 +( 1− i)lnc2;
T(c1,c 2)=λ[τ lnc1 +( 1− τ)lnc2];
with 0 <i , τ<1,a n dλ ≥ 0. In this case, the consumption proﬁle most
preferred by the individual as a singleton choice set involves consuming pro-
portion i of the resource in the ﬁrst period. On the other hand, with a larger
choice set there is a temptation to consume a higher proportion τ in the ﬁrst
5period. With A = Γ(W), the actual choice is a compromise between these
two functions, giving weight λ
1+λ to the temptation as opposed to the ideal








Our speciﬁc interest is in the level of self-control. This can be identi-
ﬁed as the diﬀerence between the actual and the ideal proportion of wealth
consumed in period 1:
a − i =(
λ
1+λ
)(τ − i). (1)
Our goal is to design a question to measure this self-control parameter.
2.4 The Hypothetical Choice Problem
The Gul-Pesendorfer model maps well to psychological intuition concerning
self-control. The parameter i measures the ideal split between current and fu-
ture consumption, in the sense that it is the split the agent would most prefer
with complete commitment. The parameter τ measures the most tempting
allocation, in the sense that any deviation from it results in a utility penalty
for “resisting temptation to move away from the ideal”. The parameter λ
characterizes the relative weight of the temptation in actual decisions, with
lower values corresponding to a greater ability to resist temptation. Hence
we sought to measure precisely these allocations in a hypothetical problem
of resource allocation.
In designing our allocation problem, one key goal was to avoid ambiguities
concerning the timing of consumption. With this goal in mind, we presented
respondents with a scenario in which they had won a prize that they could
u s ea ta n yt i m ei nt h en e x tt w oy e a r s ,b u tw h i c hw o u l db e c o m ev a l u e l e s s
thereafter. We wanted the prize to be attractive, yet too expensive for most
agents to pay for out of their own resources (to remove simple substitution
into the general lifetime pattern of consumption). At the same time, we did
not want the prize to be a completely indivisible once in a lifetime experience,
since this would reduce the information content of our allocation question.
Here is the precise scenario we used, including the words used to act as a
bridge to the questions themselves:
6• Suppose that you win 10 certiﬁcates, each of which can be used (once) to
receive a “dream restaurant night.” On each such night, you and a compan-
ion will get the best table and an unlimited budget for food and drink at
a restaurant of your choosing. There will be no cost to you: all payments
including gratuities come as part of the prize. The certiﬁcates are available
for immediate use, starting tonight, and there is an absolute guarantee that
they will be honored by any restaurant you select if they are used within
a two year window. However if they are not used up within this two year
period, any that remain are valueless.
The questions below concern how many of the certiﬁcates you would ideally
like to use in each year, how tempted you would be to depart from this ideal, and
what you expect you would do in practice:
• 3a. From your current perspective, how many of the ten certiﬁcates would
you ideally like to use in year 1 as opposed to year 2?
• 3b. Some people might be tempted to depart from their ideal allocation in
(a). Which of the following best describes you: (please mark only one)
1. I would be strongly tempted to keep more certiﬁcates for use in the
second year than would be ideal.
2. I would be somewhat tempted to keep more certiﬁcates for use in the
second year than would be ideal.
3. I would have no temptation in either direction (skip to 3d)
4. I would be somewhat tempted to use more certiﬁcates in the ﬁrst year
than would be ideal.
5. I would be strongly tempted to use more certiﬁcates in the ﬁrst year
than would be ideal.
• 3c. If you were to give in to your temptation, how many certiﬁcates do you
think you would use in year 1 as opposed to year 2?
• 3d. Based on your most accurate forecast of how you think you would
actually behave, how many of the nights would you end up using in year 1
as opposed to year 2?
Our statistical analysis of the answers to these questions is based on the
following three identifying assumptions.
7• Identifying Assumptions
— A1: We assume that the Gul and Pesendorfer model is valid.
— A2: W ea s s u m et h a to u rq u e s t i o ni sa n s w e r e di nt e r m so ft h e
model, as a question concerning the value of the key parameters
of the model in the allocation problem that is presented.
— A3: We assume that the self-control parameter translates per-
fectly from our two period hypothetical choice problem to the
more general problem of wealth accumulation.
Given these assumptions, our fundamental interest is in measured self-
control, a−i,a sd e ﬁn e di ne q u a t i o n( 1 )a b o v e .O u ri d e n t i f y i n ga s s u m p t i o n s
assert that this measure is identical in our free dinner scenario and in the
general problem of wealth accumulation. Modulo the corner constraints dis-
cussed below, the gap between expected and ideal consumption corresponds
precisely to the self-control problem in the Gul-Pesendorfer theory.
Note that while our question derives explicitly from the model of Gul and
Pesendorfer, our measure of self-control may closely approximate true self-
control even if alternative models of self-control apply. Consider for example
the hyperbolic discounting model of Laibson [1997]. In this model, changing
tastes give rise to a time inconsistency problem. The obvious interpretation
of our measure of self-control in this model is that expected consumption
is the solution to the game between the various temporal selves, while ideal
consumption is the plan that maximizes utility from the present perspective.3
In the planner-doer model of Thaler and Shefrin [1981], the doer values only
current consumption, while the planner maximizes the present value of the
utility of each doer. At cost, the planner can alter the doer’s preferences to
produce an interior optimum at a cost. In this model, ideal consumption
would be the plan that maximized the planner’s utility, while expected con-
sumption would be the result of the interaction between planner and doer.4
3One diﬀerence between the models is that there is no obvious counterpart to temp-
tation in the standard formulation of the hyperbolic model; the agent either commits to
the ideal or adjusts current behavior in light of future choices. In addition, it is somewhat
easier to rationalize the ﬁnding of under-consumption in terms of the Gul-Pesendorfer
framework.
4It should not be surprising that we can reinterpret our question in terms of the planner-
doer framework, since Benabou and Pycia [2003] show that the Gul-Pesendorfer model
itself can be so interpreted.
8Finally, Benhabib and Bisin [2002] and Bernheim and Rangel [2001] con-
ceptualize self-control problems as involving conﬂict between the automatic
a n dc o n t r o l l e dp a t h w a y si nt h eb r a i n . T h ec o n t r o l l e dp a t h w a y sr e p r e s e n t
reasoned goal pursuit, while the automatic pathways represent programmed
responses that reﬂect the inﬂuence of evolution or classical conditioning. In
these formulations, ideal consumption would correspond to the reasoned op-
timum, while expected consumption would reﬂect also the inﬂuence of the
automatic processes.
2.5 Methodology Revisited
In many ways our empirical methodology is standard, based as it is on strong
but somewhat obvious identifying assumptions. Like us, Barsky, Juster,
Kimball, and Shapiro [1997] use a theoretically-inspired approach to mea-
sure preference parameters such as the discount rate in the context of a
hypothetical allocation problem. Yet there is one critical diﬀerence between
our methodology and theirs. The earlier questions on preference parameters
refer only to hypothetical choice experiments. In contrast our question on
self-control refers not only to choices, but also to ideals and to temptation,
two concepts that are not directly connected to a speciﬁcc h o i c ee x p e r i m e n t .
While our eﬀort to measure self-control using non-behavioral questions
may be controversial, the work of Mischel is a powerful precedent. Appar-
ently, intuitively derived measures of temptation and self-control may provide
valuable insights into actual behavior. Of course, ambiguities remain. Temp-
tation and ideals may mean diﬀerent things to diﬀerent people, making the
answers to our question in practice somewhat hard to interpret. In formal
terms, we get around this simply by relying on a well-speciﬁed theory, and
making the identifying assumption that the question is interpreted in line
with that theory. Yet our identifying assumption concerning the interpre-
tation of a verbal question is particularly strong. This makes it incumbent
upon us to consider seriously alternative interpretations of our empirical re-
sults given various alternative interpretations of the questions we ask. We
address this issue in section 6 below, where we discuss the issues that may
arise if our identifying assumptions are false.
Is it possible to ask questions on self-control that ﬁt entirely within the
classical choice theoretic framework? In principle, the answer is yes. After
all, one of the beautiful features of the Gul-Pesendorfer model is that it is
based entirely on choices that are at least potentially observable. This allows
9us to pursue an alternative approach to measuring self-control based only on
hypothetical choices. These choices concern the use of commitment devices.
The precise questions and their answers are summarized in detail in section
4. When we use these questions as proxies for self-control, the results are
in many ways similar to those using our primary temptation-based measure.
However the evidence suggests that responses to these questions hinge as
much on the psychology of commitment as they do on the psychology of self-
control. Our temptation-based question avoids this form of contamination.
3 The Nature and Extent of Self-Control Prob-
lems
Our question on self-control was included in a new survey sent in February
2003 to a sample of TIAA-CREF participants. All of the 2,406 individuals
who received the survey had responded to two previous surveys: the Survey
of Participant Finances (henceforth SPF), ﬁe l d e di nJ a n u a r y2 0 0 0 ;a n dt h e
Survey of Financial Attitudes and Behavior (henceforth FAB), ﬁelded in
January 2001. Combining our three surveys, we have very rich data on
personality, behavior, preferences, demographics, wealth, and income.
The response rate to our third survey was on the order of 68%, with some
1,632 providing responses. We removed 87 respondents from the sample who
failed to answer both the questions on actual and ideal consumption. We also
removed respondents for whom the answers to the question on self-control
were clearly meaningless. In particular, we asked respondents to place a cash
value on the free dinner prize, and removed from the sample the 25 for whom
the prize had no value. Table 1 presents key demographic statistics for the
remaining 1,520. The category totals in Table 1 are typically smaller than
1,520 due to non-response to individual questions.
Replying to the third survey has not fundamentally altered the demo-
graphic structure of the sample, although response rates were higher among
older households. As before, respondents stand out in terms of their educa-
tional achievements, with roughly 1 in 3 being teaching faculty. In Ameriks,
Caplin, and Leahy [2002] we compared ﬁnancial characteristics of respon-
dents to the ﬁrst two surveys with those of working households in the 1998
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). Net worth is some 2.5—3 times higher
in our sample, while debt levels are generally lower. Not only are the de-
10mographic and economic proﬁl e so fr e s p o n d e n t sd i ﬀerent from those of the
general population, so too are their behavioral and psychological proﬁles.
In particular, the sample is increasingly self-selected on the basis of interest
in responding to intricate survey questions. For example, it is intuitively
reasonable to expect survey respondents to be more conscientious than are
non-respondents. As we will see in section 5 below, this extra conscientious-
ness may have signiﬁcant implications for wealth holdings.5
3.1 Ideals and Expectations
Table 2 presents the distribution of answers to the questions concerning the
ideal and expected allocation of resources. Some 60% of respondents in-
dicated that their ideal allocation involved an equal split between the two
periods. Among those who gave other answers, the overwhelming tendency
was to wish to consume more in the ﬁrst year, with eight times as many
selecting answers of 6 and above than answers of 4 and below. The contrast
at the extremes is especially striking. More than 15% of respondents stated
a wished to consume all of their meals in the ﬁrst year, with only a tiny
fraction preferring to consume all in the second year.
The distribution of expected consumption is more dispersed than is that
of ideal consumption. Less than 50% expect an equal split. There is also
a greater tendency towards low consumption in the ﬁrst year. Only three
times as many select answers of 6 and above as opposed to answers of 4 and
below.
3.2 Measured Self-Control
To a ﬁrst approximation, the self-control parameter in the Gul and Pesendor-
fer model corresponds to the numerical diﬀerence between expected and ideal
consumption, which we refer to as the EI gap. Table 3 in the appendix
presents the joint distribution of expected and ideal consumption. Note that
5While our non-representativeness in economic and demographic terms clearly diﬀeren-
tiates us from more standard surveys, not so the behavioral self selection. Respondents to
surveys such as the HRS may be just as psychologically non-random as are respondents to
our survey, since by deﬁnition they are the members of their demographic and economic
cohort who were willing to answer the questions posed. As understanding of the role of
behavioral variables advances, the methodology for achieving randomness in large national
surveys will need to be amended.
11while there are a few outliers, 95% of responses lie within two columns of
the diagonal, implying that the EI gap is typically small. Note also that
either the expected or the ideal consumption lies at a corner for about 17%
of the observations. In technical terms, these corner observations imply that
our measure of self-control is censored, and our statistical procedures are
designed to handle this censoring as eﬃciently as possible.
A simple example clariﬁes the impact of corner constraints on our measure
of the EI gap. Consider two individuals with identical self-control problems
as regards wealth accumulation, yet diﬀerent ideal levels of consumption. In-
dividual A wishes ideally to consume 3 meals this year, in order to anticipate
next year’s meals with all the more pleasure (Loewenstein [1987]). Taking
account of her self-control problem, she expects in fact to consume 7. Indi-
vidual B is keener than is A to try new restaurants sooner rather than later,
and he picks an ideal ﬁrst year consumption level of 9. Given his self-control
problem, he expects to consume all 10 in year 1. In this example, note that
even though A and B have identical self-control problems, our survey fails to
pick this up: A’s EI gap is measured as 4, while B’s is measured as 1. The
corner constraint has censored our observation of B’s self-control problem.
Given our identifying assumptions an observation may be censored only
if either the expected or the ideal level of consumption is at a corner (10 or
0). In total, there are 267 such observations in our sample. Note that the
most severe examples of censoring arise when both observations are at the
same corner. In particular, there are some 123 individuals for whom expected
and ideal consumption are both at the maximum value of 10. In these cases
our measure of the EI gap has no information whatever on the nature of
the underlying self-control problem. We will control for this censoring in the
estimation.
Table 4 reports the distribution of the EI gap. The ﬁrst column presents
the distribution for all 1520 who answered the self-control questions. The
third column presents the distribution for the 1253 for whom this measure is
unaﬀected by the corner constraints.
Table 4 provides strong conﬁrmation of our ﬁrst ﬁnding. In our sam-
ple, more people expect to use less than their ideal number of certiﬁcates
in the ﬁrst year than expect to use more than ideal number. Hence prob-
lems of under-consumption are at least as prevalent as are those of under-
consumption. The third column of table 4 which excludes ambiguous ob-
servations gives the clearest picture: almost one respondent in ﬁve has a
problem of under-consumption, while only one in eight has a standard prob-
12lem of over-consumption.
4S e l f - C o n t r o l a n d W e a l t h A c c u m u l a t i o n
In this section we look ﬁrst at the impact of self-control problems on net
worth. We then look at wealth held in more and less liquid forms. Finally,
we discuss the use of our alternative measure of self-control that is based
entirely on choice behavior.
4.1 Self-Control and Net Worth
The simplest empirical approach to measuring the impact of self-control on
wealth accumulation would be to run a standard linear regression,
w = α0 + α1sc + α
0
2x +  , (2)
where w is net worth, sc is self-control and x is a vector containing other eco-
nomic and demographic variables often included in classical life-cycle regres-
sions. Yet our measure of self-control, the EI gap, may diﬀer from the true
underlying self-control measure sc due to the censoring problem described
above. Using the EI gap to proxy for sc would bias α1 away from zero, since
censoring reduces the absolute value of the EI gap relative to sc. While dis-
carding the censored observations would not produce bias, it would be very
ineﬃcient. A large self-control problem of either type makes censoring more
likely, rendering censored observations among our most informative. Hence
it is important to ﬁnd a more creative solution to the censoring problem.
Our solution to the censoring problem is adapted from the imputation
literature.6 Suppose that certain values of sc were missing at random. We
would ﬁrst estimate the conditional distribution f(sc|x). We would then re-
place each missing value with a draw from this distribution, and estimate (2).
We would repeat this procedure a number of times and take as our estimate
of α1 the average of the estimated ˆ α1’s.
Our procedure diﬀe r so n l yi nt h a tw eh a v es o m ea d d i t i o n a li n f o r m a t i o n
regarding the missing observations. We know that the right censored obser-
vations are greater than the EI gap and the left censored observations are
6See Little and Rubin (2002) for a discussion of imputation. Whereas there is an
immense literature dealing with the censoring of dependent variables, we know of no other
papers dealing with the censoring of independent variables.
13less than the EI gap. We therefore ﬁrst estimate f(sc|x). We regress
EI gap = β0 + β
0
1x + ν
Here we use all of the data including the censored observations, and we take
account of the censoring in the estimation. Next we replace the censored
observations with draws from f(sc|x,sc ≥EI gap) or f(sc|x,sc ≤EI gap)
depending on the direction of the censoring. We repeat this procedure 10
times and take as our estimate of α1 the average of the estimated ˆ α1’s.
The conﬁdence intervals take into account imputation uncertainty and are
calculated using standard multiple imputation techniques (Little and Rubin
[2002], p.86).
Table 5 summarizes the results of this analysis. Our sample contains only
374 households, since we lack complete net worth data for many households.
We also remove a few outliers with gross ﬁn a n c i a la s s e t si ne x c e s so f$ 5
million and exclude annuitants because their retirement wealth is diﬃcult to
assess.
Table 5 identiﬁes a clear impact of self-control on wealth accumulation.
Note that we include also the answer to question 3a on the ideal level of
consumption, and ﬁnd it to have no explanatory power whatsoever. In quan-
titative terms, the equation suggests that the average over-consumer accumu-
lates some 18% less than one with no self-control problem, while the average
under-consumer accumulates some 27% more.7
The ﬁnding of a powerful impact of self-control on wealth accumulation
is very robust. Introducing additional right hand side variables, such as pref-
erence parameters, information on parental gifts and bequests, and wealth
shocks, has little impact on the key ﬁnding. Dropping outliers or dropping
censored observations also has little eﬀect on the size or signiﬁcance of the
eﬀect of the EI gap. As an additional check for robustness, we run a sim-
pler procedure based only on a qualitative indicator of the nature of the
self-control problem. Individuals with a strictly positive EI gap are classiﬁed
as “over-consumers,” while those with a strictly negative gap are classiﬁed
as “under-consumers.” Agents for whom ideal and actual are either both at
the upper bound of 10, or both at the lower bound of zero are impossible to
classify and therefore dropped from the analysis. The results are remarkably
similar to those in table 5. An over-consumption problem reduces net worth
7The average gap among over-consumers in the sample used in the regressions is 1.4
certiﬁcates; the average gap among under-consumers is -2.1 certiﬁcates.
14by 17%, whereas an under-consumption problem raises net worth by 27%.
The two variables are jointly signiﬁcant at the 5.4% level. Imposing the con-
straint that the over-consumption and under-consumption eﬀects are equal
and opposite yields a coeﬃcient of .22 and a p-value of .017.
4.2 Self-Control and the Composition of Wealth
Most theories of self-control suggest that the impact of self-control problems
on wealth should vary according to the liquidity characteristics of the un-
derlying assets and debts. In particular, it should be hard for those with
self-control problems to accumulate ﬁnancial assets outside their retirement
account. Yet with respect to retirement assets, even the sign of the eﬀect of
self-control problems is hard to predict, since the wealth-reducing urge to-
ward immediate consumption may be oﬀset by the desire to commit resources
to the future in an illiquid form.
Table 6 conﬁrms that there does indeed appear to be a more signiﬁcant
impact of self-control problems on liquid than on illiquid assets. The liquid
assets we analyze are non-retirement ﬁnancial assets. The less liquid assets
are retirement assets. We restrict the sample to the group aged 64 and under
because the diﬀerence in liquidity between retirement and non-retirement
assets is radically reduced when individuals reach the age of retirement. We
include agents for whom we have data on these components of wealth, but
lack data on total net worth. The resulting sample contains 362 households
and is the same for both regressions.
As theory predicts, the impact of self-control problems on non-retirement
ﬁnancial assets is larger and more statistically signiﬁcant than that on illiquid
retirement assets. A one-standard-deviation increase in the EI Gap reduces
non-retirement ﬁnancial assets by roughly 31%, and retirement assets by
12%.8 The latter eﬀect is statistically insigniﬁcant.
4.3 A Choice-Based Measure
As already discussed, we pursued an alternative approach to measuring self-
control that was based purely on (hypothetical) choices. To this end our
earlier question on temptation and self-control were followed immediately by
questions concerning the choice of commitment devices:
8The standard deviation of the measure in this sampe is 1.52 certiﬁcates.
15• 3e. Suppose that you had the option to restrict some of the certiﬁcates for
use only in the second year. Would you use this option?
— Yes
— No
• 3f. Suppose that you had the option to restrict some of the certiﬁcates for
use only in the ﬁrst year. Would you use this option?
— Yes
— No
If respondents answered yes to either question 3e or question 3f, they
were asked in addition to specify precisely how many certiﬁcates they would
so restrict.
The answers to these questions deﬁne a set of constrained allocations
that the respondent ﬁnds desirable. Agents have self-control problems if
their expected consumption lies outside this set. In this case our measure of
the self-control problem is the signed distance between the expected choice
and the constraint set. We call this the revealed preference (RP) gap. As
before this measure allows for both types of self-control problem, and is zero
in the absence of such a problem.
Table 7 shows the distribution of the RP gap. We have fewer observations
than for the EI gap, due mainly to non-response. We also eliminate a small
number of observations for which the constraint set is empty. Note also that
only one individual is impacted by corner constraints.
Two diﬀerences between the RP gap and the EI gap stand out. First,
there are fewer agents with self-control problems when measured by the RP
gap. Just over 10% of agents have self-control problems as measured by the
RP gap, as opposed to just over 30% according to the EI gap. Second, the
RP gap sheds a diﬀerent light on the relative importance of the two types
of self-control problems. According to the RP gap, those with self-control
problems are more likely to have problems of over-consumption than of under-
consumption, whereas under-consumption was more prevalent according to
the EI gap.
In spite of the diﬀerences between the EI gap and the RP gap, the two
measures are highly correlated. The correlation is .24. Moreover, when we
use the RP gap in place of the EI gap in our wealth regression, we again
16ﬁnd a negative and signiﬁcant relationship between self-control and wealth
accumulation. The coeﬃc i e n to nt h eR Pg a pi s- . 1 9 5 , with a standard error of
.092, and signiﬁcant at the 4 percent level.9 The relationship between wealth
and the RP gap, however, is based on only 32 individuals with non-zero self-
control problems. Given the small numbers, the magnitude and signiﬁcance,
but not the sign, of the estimated eﬀects are very sensitive to changes in the
sample. This was not the case with the EI gap.
While our revealed preference measure of self-control does correlate to a
certain extent with wealth, it may be corrupted by considerations that are
external to the model. Speciﬁcally, the psychology of ﬂexibility and that
of self-control are somewhat distinct, and they get inextricably linked in
our revealed preference question. Some respondents may dislike ﬂexibility,
without this having any obvious connection to self-control problems. For
example, the vast majority (about 80%) of the respondents who restrict
certiﬁcates to one period also choose to restrict some to the other period,
possibly to enhance planning for and anticipating the meals.10 On the other
side, even individuals who have self control problems, yet who also have a
desire to retain ﬂexibility, may report a zero RP gap. In support of this,
those with self-control problems according to the EI gap but not according
to the RP gap are much less likely to set budgets and to plan for vacations
than are those with both types of self-control problem.
5 What Determines Self-Control?
One of the main reasons for measuring individual diﬀerences in self-control is
to improve our understanding of how these diﬀerences arise. In this section
we look to personality psychology for ﬁrst insights on the determinants of
self-control. Speciﬁcally we consider the impact on self-control of conscien-
tiousness, one of the Big Five traits uncovered by personality psychologists.
In section 5.1 we provide a brief introduction to the Big Five model and
to conscientiousness in particular. In section 5.2 we introduce our survey
measures of conscientiousness, and demonstrate the subtle yet intuitive con-
nection between conscientiousness and self-control. In section 5.3 we present
9This regression included the same variables as the wealth regression with the EI gap,
with the exception of ideal consumption. There were 340 observations.
10It may also be the case that respondents did not understand that by restricting some
certiﬁcates to one period they did not have to restrict some to the other.
17preliminary ﬁndings on two other inﬂuences on self-control, one demographic,
and one related to behavior. The demographic variable that we discuss is
age, while the behavioral variable is ﬁnancial planning.
5.1 The Big Five
In a recent survey article in the Handbook of Personality, Oliver John and
Sanjay Srivastava write of personality psychology:
“After decades of research, the ﬁeld is ﬁnally approaching con-
sensus of a general taxonomy of personality traits, the “Big Five”
personality dimensions.” [John and Srivastava, 1999, p. 103]
The Big Five represent personality at a very broad level of abstraction,
with each summarizing a large number of distinct, more speciﬁc personality
characteristics. The ﬁve factors are typically given numerical and linguistic
labels as follows: factor I, extraversion; factor II, agreeableness; factor III,
conscientiousness; factor IV, neuroticism: factor V, openness.
Even a cursory look at the Big Five suggests that the characteristic most
closely related to self-control is conscientiousness, since all of the others deal
with entirely diﬀerent aspects of the personality. It turns out that this con-
nection is far deeper than one might expect simply from the dictionary de-
ﬁnitions. In their inﬂuential schema, Costa and McCrae [1992] break down
each of the Big Five into a number of diﬀerent facets: one of the six facets of
conscientious individuals is that they are not impulsive. Similarly, John and
Srivastava [1999] provide a more expansive deﬁnition of factor III as follows:
“Conscientiousness describes socially prescribed impulse control
that facilitates task- and goal-directed behaviors, such as thinking
before acting, delaying gratiﬁcation, following norms and rules,
and planning, organizing, and prioritizing tasks” (p.121).
Given the close link between conscientiousness and self-control, psycholo-
gists have studied the role of conscientiousness in various patterns of behavior
associated with lack of self-control. In a study of adults, conscientiousness
has emerged as the only general predictor of job performance. In a study of
adolescents, John et al. [1994] found that low levels of conscientiousness pre-
dict juvenile delinquency and various other disorders, while high levels were
associated with superior school performance. As John and Srivastava point
18out, one of the long term goals of this research is to help design interventions
that might “teach children low in conscientiousness relevant behaviors and
skills (e.g. strategies for delaying gratiﬁcation)” (p. 125). Finally, research
by Friedman et al. [1995a, b] and by Roberts and Bogg [2003] suggests that
conscientious individuals have superior health and longevity outcomes.
5.2 Conscientiousness and Self-Control
We included a series of questions in our survey to allow the link between
conscientiousness and self-control to be studied. The particular questions
we used were drawn directly from the questionnaires presented in Costa and
Widiger [1994]. Respondents were asked to indicate on a simple six point
scale the extent of their agreement or disagreement with the following state-
ments.
• Q1g: Sometimes I am not as dependable or reliable as I should be.
• Q1h: I never seem able to get organized.
• Q1i: I often feel that I speak or act too quickly, without thinking about
the consequences.
• Q1j: I am often late for appointments.
We begin with a negative ﬁnding. Our measures of conscientiousness
have essentially no correlation with the raw EI gap. If we regress the level
of the EI gap on the variables that we included in the wealth regression
and include our measures of conscientiousness, none of the conscientious
measures are remotely signiﬁcant, either individually or as a group.11 More
broadly, the raw EI gap appears uncorrelated with any variables of economic,
demographic, or psychological interest.
On reﬂection, this negative ﬁnding is entirely consistent with the person-
ality theoretic view of the relationship between conscientiousness and self-
control. The Big Five approach does not suggest that there should be a simple
monotonic relationship between conscientiousness and the EI gap. Rather,
it suggests that conscientiousness should shrink the EI gap toward zero and
away from either extreme positive or extreme negative values. An individual
11This regression used all 976 observations for which complete data on all of the variables
was available.
19with a large positive EI gap has a standard problem of over-consumption.
The natural prediction is that those who are highly conscientious should
have less signiﬁcant self-control problems of this type. Algebraically, this
corresponds to a smaller EI gap. On the other hand, a large negative EI
gap indicates a self-control problem of under-consumption. Again, a consci-
entious individual should have a less signiﬁcant self-control problem of this
sort. Algebraically, this corresponds now to a larger (less negative) EI gap.
When we explore the data from this viewpoint, we ﬁnd that conscien-
tious individuals do indeed appear to have lesser problems of self-control.
For those who are highly conscientious, there is a lower divergence between
actual and ideal consumption, regardless of sign. For example, the standard
deviation of the EI gap is 1.79 for the 124 respondents who indicated agree-
ment to both questions 1g and 1h, and only 1.05 for the 962 respondents
who indicated disagreement on both questions. In essence, the conscientious
have smaller problems of self-control in either direction than do those who
are not conscientious.
In table 8, we present evidence that conscientiousness is a good predic-
tor of whether or not an individual has a self-control problem. The table
contains results of a probit regression where the variable to be predicted is
an indicator of a self-control problem (a non-zero EI gap). The explanatory
variables include the ﬁrst two of our conscientiousness questions (Q1g and
Q1h), concerning respectively dependability and organization (all four mea-
sures are signiﬁcant when included individually; these are the two questions
that retain signiﬁcance when all four are added to the right-hand side to-
gether). In order to increase sample size, we add only age, gender, and the
ideal level of consumption as explanatory variables, ending up with a sam-
ple of 1300. Both of our measures of conscientiousness are strong predictors
of whether or not an individual has a self-control problem. The results are
completely robust to alternative speciﬁcations.
This relationship between self-control and conscientiousness works sepa-
rately for problems of over-consumption and for problems of under-consumption.
If we limit our regression to the 1015 observations for which the EI gap is
non-negative, then the coeﬃcient on Q1g is .10 with a p-value of .015 and
the coeﬃcient on Q1h is .12 with a p-value of .005. If we limit our regression
to the 1133 observations for which the EI gap is non-positive, the coeﬃcient
on Q1g is .05 with a p-value of .258 and the coeﬃcient on Q1h is .16 with a
p-value less than .001.
205.3 Other Inﬂuences on Self-Control
Table 8 contains an interesting ﬁn d i n gc o n c e r n i n gt h ei m p a c to fa g eo ns e l f -
control problems. There is a profound reduction in the scale of these prob-
lems as individuals age. Again, this ﬁnding shows up only when one uses
the indicator for existence of a self-control problem, not the level of self-
control. Older individuals experience fewer self-control problems either of
over-consumption, or of under-consumption, than do their younger counter-
parts. This ﬁnding is certainly consistent with the psychological literature,
in which it is a common-place that temptation falls with age.
The strong links that we have uncovered between conscientiousness and
self-control shed new light on the ﬁndings of Ameriks, Caplin, and Leahy
[2003a] concerning the relationship between wealth accumulation and the
“propensity to plan”. As one might expect, there is a strong relationship
between the propensity to plan and conscientiousness: the extent to which
the agent enjoys planning for vacations is highly correlated in our sample
with both measures of conscientiousness, as well as with the indicator of a
non-zero EI gap. This suggests that an increase in the propensity to plan
will increase wealth accumulation only for individuals with the standard
problem of over-consumption. For those with an under-consumption problem,
increases in the propensity to plan should have the opposite eﬀect of lowering
wealth accumulation. The net eﬀect of the propensity to plan on wealth
accumulation may depend on the mixture of self-control problems that are
present in the general population.
6 Alternative Explanations
We examine possible explanations for our results when our identifying as-
sumptions fail. Most of the issues concern the interpretation of the answers
to our survey question. Are there plausible interpretations of the answers
to our questions that would rationalize our ﬁndings even if self-control has
absolutely no real impact on wealth accumulation?
6.1 Social Desirability and Rationalization
It is possible that individuals who have high wealth for reasons that have
nothing to do with self-control answered our questions as if they had prob-
lems of under-consumption. One possible explanation for this behavior might
21be social desirability. Looking at our questions, they might have understood
that we were looking for just such a correlation, and their desire to conform
might have done the rest. A second possible explanation for such behavior
would be rationalization: looking at their own high wealth, they may have
concluded that they cannot be the types who consume more than they would
ideally like to.
While it is not possible for us to provide strong evidence against this
alternative hypothesis, there are reasons to doubt its power.
• Our data provide no evidence to support the idea that high wealth
causes individuals to vary their reported level of self-control. If such
an eﬀect were present, we would expect exogenous shocks to wealth
uncorrelated with true self-control to shift reported self control. Our
latest survey contains explicit measures of two such exogenous shocks
to wealth: an indicator for the past receipt of an unexpected gift or
bequests, and an indicator for major unexpected expenses. These two
variables are of the expected sign, and are jointly signiﬁcant at the
2% level in our basic wealth regression. Yet their impact on the mea-
sured level of self-control turns out to be statistically and economically
negligible.
• If measured self-control is simply an artefact of actual wealth seen
through a ﬁlter of social desirability or rationalization, then what ex-
plains the relationship between self-control and conscientiousness? The
fact that this relatively subtle relationship shows up so clearly in our
data makes it highly plausible that our measure of self-control is cor-
related with true self-control. A proponent of the social desirability
explanation might argue that while both correlations are present, the
explanation for the measured self-control-wealth correlation has noth-
ing to do with the measured self-control-real self-control correlation.
This is a ﬁne line to tread.
• If social desirability and self-justiﬁcation were the only forces that ex-
plained the correlation between wealth and measured self-control, then
one would expect survey measures of other preference parameters such
as the discount factor and the precautionary motive to correlate highly
with actual wealth accumulation. Yet the history of questions on these
subjects is in large part a history of irrelevance. For example, we have
in a previous survey asked a detailed question concerning the discount
22factor, in which the desired answer was far more directly visible, and
rationalization far closer to hand. Yet there was absolutely no corre-
lation between the measured discount factor and wealth accumulation.
In the current study, one might have expected social desirability and
self justiﬁcation to produce a correlation between actual wealth and
impatience, as measured by the expected amount of consumption in
the ﬁrst year. Yet this relationship is extremely weak, and is reduced
to nothing in the presence of measured self-control.
6.2 The Ideal World
There is considerable scope for misinterpretation of question 3(a) on ideal
consumption. In particular, those who are currently more busy than they
would like might ideally wish to consume more in the ﬁrst year than they
b e l i e v et h e yw i l l .C o n v e r s e l y ,t h o s ew i t has u r f e i to ff r e et i m em a yp r e f e ra
world in which they were busier and went out less. In both cases, the ideal
represents what the respondent would do in a better environment.
If the answers have an “ideal world” interpretation, our self-control prob-
lem of over-consumption may in part reﬂe c taq u i t ed i ﬀerent problem. The
interpretation of the correlation with wealth would be that those who were
too busy at work or with the family to go out as much as they would like
have accumulated unusually large amounts of wealth, while those who are
not as busy as they would like have accumulated little wealth. While such
a story can be told, the correlation with conscientiousness seems harder to
explain. The interpretation would have to be that conscientious individuals
for some reason undergo smaller ﬂuctuations in either direction in how busy
they are, or that even though they may be extremely busy, they nevertheless
expect to go out just as they would have if they were less busy. Possible, but
hardly compelling.
6.3 Absent-Mindedness
The answers to our questions on self-control may be impacted by absent-
mindedness of a sort analyzed by Piccione and Rubinstein [1997]. Absent-
minded individuals know that they are forgetful, and hence may expect not
to use all of their certiﬁcates over the two year period. Ideally, consumers of
this sort may wish to use all 10 certiﬁcates in two years: 5 in the ﬁrst year
and ﬁve in the second. Yet they may believe that they will forget about the
23certiﬁcates until it is too late, and end up using only 8 of the certiﬁcates,
4 in each year. What our data would record in such cases would be self-
control problems of under-consumption. The real issue would be a problem
of control, which we would instead treat as a problem of self-control.
Even if absent-mindedness is at play in the answers to our questions on
self-control, the connection between absent-mindedness and the answer to
question 3 is likely to be subtle. In the example in the last paragraph, an
absent-minded individual consumed less than the ideal number of certiﬁcates
in the ﬁrst year. Yet some absent-minded individuals may choose instead to
consume more than the ideal number of certiﬁcates in the ﬁrst year, in order
to reduce possible waste caused by later forgetfulness. Another important
caveat to this case is that the connection between wealth accumulation and
absent-mindedness is little understood. Ameriks, Caplin, and Leahy [2003b]
have analyzed the optimal pattern of consumption and savings for an absent-
minded consumer. While the comparison is complex, the results suggest that
those who are absent-minded generally have an incentive to consume more
rather than less than those with perfect memories. Hence our ﬁnding that
those with negative EI gaps are generally wealthy argues that at least some
of this eﬀect is explained by problems of self-control rather than problems of
control.
7C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
We have used survey techniques to generate new insights into the nature and
implications of self-control problems. Clearly, self-control problems represent
a fascinating link between psychological forces and economic behavior, and
survey techniques have much to oﬀer to our search for understanding of cause
and consequence.
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Curr. married 1016 67.6
Prev. married 278 18.5
Never married 210 14.0
Education
College or below 429 28.2
Masters or Prof. 533 35.1
Ph.D. 558 36.7
Occupation
Teaching faculty 538 40.8
Mgmt., Sen. Admn. 242 18.3
Other Tech./Prof. 276 20.9
Other 264 20.0
Age











Source: Authors’ tabulations of 2003 FAB survey
data.
29Table 2
Ideal and Expected Allocation of
Certiﬁcates to First Year
Ideal Expected
Certiﬁcates (n) (%) (n) (%)
0 3 0.2 4 0.3
1 10 0.7 14 0.9
2 15 1.0 26 1.7
3 13 0.9 62 4.1
4 3 12 . 0 1 1 47 . 5
5 907 59.7 713 46.9
6 192 12.6 243 16.0
7 58 3.8 77 5.1
8 43 2.8 55 3.6
9 0 0.0 6 0.4
10 248 16.3 206 13.6
Total 1520 100.0 1520 100.0
Source: Authors’ tabulations of 2003 FAB survey
data.
30Table 3
Cross-tabulation of Ideal and Expected
Allocation of Certiﬁcates to First Year
Expected
I d e a l 0123 4 5 67891 0 T o t a l
0 3000 0 0 0000 0 3
1 0 1 000 0 0 0000 0 1 0
2 10 1 11 1 0 1000 0 1 5
3 003 1 0 0 0 0000 0 1 3
4 00262 0 2 1000 0 3 1
5 018 3 87 6 6 4 39 9 2 841 9 9 0 7
6 00051 64 0 1 1 8661 0 1 9 2
7 0001 01 0 9 3 140 3 5 8
8 0010 0 4 84 2 21 3 4 3
9 0000 0 0 0000 0 0
1 0 0311 11 4 78 1 93 1 9 1 2 4 8
Total 4 15 28 65 118 718 249 84 63 15 216 1,520





E-I (n) (%) (n) (%)
5 9 0.6 0 0.0
4 2 0.1 2 0.2
3 8 0.5 5 0.4
23 9 2 . 6 3 6 2 . 9
1 113 7.4 113 9.0
0 1,059 69.7 865 69.0
-1 141 9.3 138 11.0
-2 94 6.2 74 5.9
-3 25 1.6 17 1.4
-4 9 0.6 2 0.2
-5 14 0.9 0 0.0
-6 2 0.1 1 0.1
-7 1 0.1 0 0.0
-8 1 0.1 0 0.0
-9 3 0.2 0 0.0
Total 1,520 100.0 1,253 0.0
Source: Authors’ tabulations of 2003 FAB sur-
vey data.
32Table 5
Net Worth Regression Results
Variable Coeﬀ. Std. Err. Pr > |t|
Expected-ideal gap -0.130** 0.055 0.017
Ideal level -0.067 0.044 0.127
Log 1999 income 0.135 0.170 0.425
Zero 1999 income 1.264* 0.728 0.082
Past income 0.509*** 0.158 0.001
Zero past income 1.467** 0.695 0.035
Future income -0.011 0.106 0.916
Zero future income -0.037 0.454 0.934
Age 0.212*** 0.045 0.000
Age2 -0.001*** 0.000 0.003
Empl. status
Working Omitted
Partially retired 0.026 0.220 0.906
Retired 0.292 0.258 0.258
Occupation
Faculty Omitted
Mgmt./Sen. Admin. -0.156 0.153 0.308
Tech./Professional 0.022 0.146 0.881
Other -0.099 0.170 0.559
Education
College or below -0.305** 0.143 0.033
M.A./Profesional Omitted
Ph.D. -0.032 0.126 0.798
R. has DB plan -0.203 0.126 0.108
S. has DB plan -0.080 0.153 0.603
Marital status
Curr. married Omitted
Prev. married -0.600*** 0.168 0.000
Never married -0.344** 0.157 0.029
Male respondent -0.047 0.111 0.673
Num. kids 0.028 0.062 0.650
Constant -3.046*** 1.117 0.006
Source: Authors’ tabulation of 2003 survey data.
Notes: The dependent variable is log of net worth. We used a censored regression
(Tobit) technique to include people with net worth of zero or less, as well as
a multiple imputation process for censored values of the expected-ideal gap; see
text. There were 374 observations used in this regression.
33Table 6
Regressions for Wealth Categories
Non-Retirement Assets Retirement Assets
Variable Coeﬀ.S . E . P r > |t| Coeﬀ.S . E . P r > |t|
Expected-ideal gap -0.208** 0.087 0.017 -0.079 0.062 0.197
Ideal level -0.075 0.076 0.329 -0.014 0.054 0.791
Log 1999 income 0.025 0.309 0.935 0.077 0.216 0.720
Zero 1999 income 1.069 1.623 0.510 1.387 1.134 0.221
Past income 0.867*** 0.303 0.004 0.546*** 0.212 0.010
Zero past income 3.495** 1.766 0.048 1.340 1.232 0.277
Future income -0.024 0.184 0.894 -0.049 0.128 0.704
Zero future income 0.373 0.807 0.644 -0.106 0.563 0.851
Age -0.106 0.101 0.294 0.283*** 0.071 0.000
Age2 0.001 0.001 0.199 -0.002*** 0.001 0.004
Empl. status
Working Omitted Omitted
Partially retired -0.268 0.387 0.489 0.424 0.270 0.116
Retired -0.334 0.515 0.516 -0.044 0.360 0.903
Occupation
Faculty Omitted Omitted
Mgmt./Sen. Admin. 0.134 0.262 0.610 -0.087 0.183 0.634
Tech./Professional 0.010 0.254 0.968 0.068 0.178 0.701
Other -0.003 0.304 0.992 -0.306 0.212 0.149
Education
College or below -0.500** 0.249 0.044 -0.368** 0.173 0.034
M.A./Profesional Omitted Omitted
Ph.D. 0.356 0.222 0.108 -0.095 0.155 0.537
R. has DB plan 0.002 0.224 0.994 -0.260* 0.157 0.098
S. has DB plan 0.129 0.272 0.635 -0.025 0.190 0.894
Marital status
Curr. married Omitted Omitted
Prev. married -0.204 0.294 0.487 -0.541*** 0.205 0.008
Never married -0.482* 0.278 0.083 -0.337* 0.194 0.083
Male respondent -0.126 0.192 0.510 0.208 0.134 0.121
Num. kids -0.065 0.107 0.543 0.004 0.074 0.962
Constant 2.208 2.278 0.332 -5.381*** 1.593 0.001
N 362 362
Source: Authors’ calculations based on 2000, 2001, and & 2003 survey data.
Note: Dependent variables are natural logarithms of the quantities listed at head of each set
of columns. Asterisks indicate the level of statistical conﬁdence for rejection of the hypothesis
that the relevant coeﬃcient is (independently) equal to zero: “***” indicates rejection at
better than a 1% level of conﬁdence, “**” indicates rejection at better than a 5% level, and
“*” indicates rejection at better than a 10% level.
34Table7
The Revealed Preference Gap
RP Gap (n) (%)
10 1 0.1
51 6 1 . 2
45 0 . 4
31 4 1 . 1
21 7 1 . 3








Source: Authors’ tabulations of 2003
FAB survey data.
35Table 8
Probit Regression for Non-Zero EI Gap
Variable Coeﬀ. Std. err. Pr> |t|
Age -0.016*** 0.003 0.000
Male -0.166** 0.764 0.030
Not Dependable 0.075*** 0.035 0.032
Not Organized 0.154*** 0.035 0.000
Ideal -0.310*** 0.32 0.000
Constant 1.657*** 0.262 0.000
Source: Authors’ tabulations of 2003 Survey Data
36